The Republicans: foreign policy forte
IN the wake of the Geneva summit and the Philippines success, an old familiar pattern is starting to reassert itself in United States politics -- a Republican administration riding the crest of a foreign-policy-support wave. The emerging question is where that wave will take us, not least in Central America. The two previous elected GOP postwar Presidents -- Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon -- often showed a kindred bent, displaying strong international skills in contrast with more lackluster domestic policies. Eisenhower had been commander in chief of the Allied armies in Europe during World War II. Nixon's White House expertise in foreign affairs, writ large in d'etente with Russia and the opening of US-Chinese relations in 1972, was nurtured during his years in Congress and as vice-president. Now Ronald Reagan is developing a similar bias in his own focus and job performance ratings. It's not economic issues that have pushed his approval levels into the 65 percent range, but aspects of foreign policy -- striking back at international terrorism and successfully managing US-Soviet relations.
This change snuck up on us. Back in 1981-84, the President's job approval ratings generally moved up and down with the economy. Reaganomics were either the albatross or the fulcrum. Not so in 1985. Last year's economy was spotty. Moreover, polls showed public approval of administration agricultural, trade, tax, and budget policy lagging in the 30-45 percent range. Yet approval of the President soared anyway.
International successes were the reason. First, back in May 1985 most polls actually showed his ratings rising after his controversial visit to the West German military cemetery at Bitburg. Many Americans admired his refus-al to break his word to US German allies -- or to back down before the media. Then in June, the President's resolution of the TWA hostage crisis sent his foreign and overall job-performance ratings climbing together.
Come autumn, they climbed again, and pollsters identified two reasons -- favorable response to the President's hard-line October speech against the Soviet Union and overwhelming support for his handling of the Achille Lauro hijacking, not least the bold decision to have US military aircraft force down an Egyptian plane carrying the Palestinian terrorists responsible. Surveys charted 75 to 85 percent support for the President's handling of the Achille Lauro episode.
By this point, most polls had the President's overall ratings, his foreign policy ratings, and his approval numbers for handling US-Soviet relations all up in the 60 to 65 percent range. Then in November Reagan went to Geneva to meet Mikhail Gorbachev at the US-Soviet summit, and that, too, was a success. Some 70 to 85 percent of Americans approved his handling of the summit, enabling the President to consolidate his October-November ratings advance.
As of March 1986 there's not a whole lot of current data, but January and February numbers from the Gallup and NBC News/Wall Street Journal polls confirm a basic point. Popular support for Reagan's handling of US-Soviet relations is still high -- well above his ratings for handling the economy, and higher than his overall foreign policy levels.
Which brings us to the key question: What are the implications of these statistics and trends? Here I would venture several theses.
The President's success on the terrorism/US-Soviet relations/Philippine fronts has buoyed him politically by pushing his overall ratings much higher than his economic management and specific policies (farm, trade, tax, et al.) would support.
In a different vein, the public enthusiasm of late 1985 could leave the administration somewhat more vulnerable than its strategists may realize to Soviet leader Gorbachev's 1986 summitry decisions.
There is the problem of hubris. Heavy popular support makes presidents bold. All of which leads to events in Nicaragua. Because the President's general foreign policy is noticeably lower than his specific ratings on handling terrorism, US-Soviet relations, and arms control, one can conclude that reflects public skepticism in some other areas. Fear of US military involvement in Central America appears to be one. Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin was quoted recently, ``The numbers aren't with us on this, and they aren't changing.'' So it is possible that the administration's current foreign policy credibility could be dissipated in another unpopular tropical military imbroglio.
For the moment there's no doubt that the US electorate has been in the mood for a more aggressive yet skilled and flexible US international stance. President Reagan and the Republicans, who have helped bring that mood to fruition, are the political beneficiaries.
Kevin Phillips is an author, commentator, and publisher of The American Political Report.
