Will US political support for Ukraine survive the midterms?

As some chastened U.S. political leaders on both the right and the left have recently discovered, American public support for Ukraine – and for confronting Russia’s aggression – remains strong more than eight months into the war.

First, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy’s declaration two weeks ago that the “blank check” Washington has offered Kyiv would end under a Republican-led Congress got a Bronx cheer – notably from other prominent Republicans.

Then less than a week later, when a group of progressive House Democrats called in an open letter to the Biden administration for diplomacy with Russia to explore ways to end the war, the outcry was such that the letter was withdrawn even as the ink dried.

The conclusion widely drawn: With Ukraine garnering strong backing around the country and across the political spectrum, suggestions of anything other than full support in the run-up to contentious midterm elections is a losing proposition.

Yet while that appears to be broadly true, some political observers and foreign-policy experts say the rebuffed challenges to America’s full-throttle support for the war may yet turn out to be harbingers of deepening doubts – especially if the war is perceived to be turning into a multiyear slog.

Moreover, the United States may come to regret the rejection of any diplomacy with Russia, others say – especially if the war’s tide turns in Russia’s favor or if a desperate Vladimir Putin resorts to weapons of mass destruction.

“So far what we’re seeing are just small cracks in what overall has been very strong support for Ukraine,” says Rajan Menon, a national security and foreign-policy expert at Defense Priorities, a Washington think tank in the realist camp that promotes focusing on core U.S. national security interests. “But what these small cracks indicate is that we could see more fissures appearing next year,” he adds, “especially if it appears the war isn’t concluding anytime soon.”

What’s behind American doubts?

For right now, Mr. Menon says he sees two different reasons behind the doubts surfacing over U.S. Ukraine policy: One he calls the “price tag crack,” and the other he labels the “safety crack.”

Representative McCarthy’s comments flowed from the “price tag crack,” he says, reflecting growing hostility among some Republicans to President Joe Biden’s periodic military assistance and civilian aid packages that now total more than $65 billion.

The “safety crack” is coming from both experts and average Americans who worry that a drawn-out war, especially one going poorly for Russia, could prompt President Putin to use nuclear weapons or some other weapon of mass destruction, Mr. Menon says.

What continues to outweigh those two basic concerns about the war are two factors buoying support for Ukraine, others say. One is the sense Americans have that Ukraine – with U.S. military assistance – is actually winning the war; the other is a strong moral conviction that Russia has launched an unjust war and that supporting Ukraine’s resistance to that aggression is the right thing for America to do.

“There was such a strong natural rallying effect early on, I don’t think we should be surprised by a slight diminution in support as the war goes on. There will be ebb and flow,” says Peter Feaver, director of Duke University’s Program in American Grand Strategy and a former official on President George W. Bush’s National Security Council.

“But the way support for Ukraine has remained strong despite some emerging factors” like inflation and higher energy costs “tells me we aren’t going to see a collapse,” he adds.

Indeed, a survey last month from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs shows nearly three-quarters of Americans supporting continued military and economic aid to Ukraine – with 58% choosing to provide that aid “as long as it takes,” even if it means paying higher prices for gas and food.

But what the survey also reveals is a deep division among Republicans: While 50% favor supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes,” another 46% prefer urging Ukraine to “settle for peace as soon as possible so that costs aren’t so great for American households.” (Among Democrats the split is 70-30.)

It’s that split among Republicans that many in Washington are keeping an eye on.

In next week’s midterm elections, the number of Republican members of Congress siding with the “settle for peace to lower costs” minority is likely to grow, Professor Feaver says.

“Barring some shock on the battlefield that profoundly changes current trends, the next Congress is going to be less supportive of Ukraine than the current one,” he says, pointing to the loss of a number of “national security types” (he cites Wyoming Republican Liz Cheney) and the likely addition of more domestic-focused Republicans from the party’s “America First” wing.

Indeed, it is the prospect of a Congress next year that is less supportive of Ukraine, and more focused on China than on Russia as America’s primary adversary, that reportedly has the Biden administration and a bipartisan group in Congress working on a large Ukraine aid bill – as much as $50 billion – to be taken up in the post-election lame-duck session.

“Getting one big aid package passed seems like a pretty smart move, in part because as we see in our survey, support for Ukraine remains so high,” says Dina Smeltz, senior fellow in public opinion and foreign policy at the Chicago Council.

“But that split among Republicans is also real,” she adds, “and when you combine that with the fact that a lot of the Republican candidates [for Congress] are of the Trump-leaning, less internationalist line of thought, it would seem to strengthen the argument for acting before seeing how things play out next year.”

When to negotiate?

The outcry that accompanied the progressive Democrats’ “give peace a chance” letter scalded not just the members of Congress who signed it, but foreign policy experts and officials who for months have been calling for a diplomatic channel with Russia.

Detractors say now is not the time for diplomacy, especially in light of Ukraine’s advances on the battlefield and the growing sense (also reflected in public opinion surveys) that Ukraine could win – meaning it could succeed in pushing Russia out of Ukrainian territory it now occupies.

Some experts argue that negotiating now with Mr. Putin would be tantamount to condemning millions of Ukrainians to living under Russian occupation.

On the other hand, proponents of diplomacy say that both Americans and Ukrainians have to consider the possibility that another year of war, with the accompanying death and destruction, won’t alter current battlefield positions much – or might even lead to a reversal of Ukraine’s fortunes.

Moreover, some say that even if Mr. Putin is pushed out of Ukraine, he could still continue a devastating air war, one that even now has impeded the delivery of electricity and water to millions of Ukrainians. And if he feels cornered, he might follow through on threats to use nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction – a horror some say would make the price of negotiations seem paltry by comparison.

No one would win that war. And nothing would shift public opinion faster, some add, than a sense that supporting Ukraine was a lost cause or had made America’s European allies more vulnerable and less safe by leading to nuclear warfare.

“The more Americans see Ukraine winning, the stronger their support will be and the longer it will remain strong,” says the Chicago Council’s Ms. Smeltz. “But the longer the war drags on, and especially if our side is not seen as winning, we certainly could see public opinion bottom out.”