China has weapons to give Russia an edge in Ukraine – why hasn’t it?

As Russia slogs into the second year of its war in Ukraine, facing a mounting toll in lives and treasure, Moscow is increasingly desperate for an infusion of lethal aid from the country that’s already serving as an economic lifeline – China.

Indeed, Beijing possesses ample, Russian-style military hardware and munitions that could help tilt the battle in the Kremlin’s favor and undermine efforts by Kyiv and its Western supporters to restore Ukraine’s sovereign territory.

Washington recently stepped up warnings to Beijing after U.S. intelligence indicated China is considering providing its northern ally with weaponry – reportedly including artillery shells and attack drones used in front-line combat. So far, no evidence has emerged showing Beijing has made such transfers, U.S. officials say.

Yet Beijing’s calculations on whether to supply Russia with arms have less to do with the trajectory of the fighting in Europe than with its own long-term concerns about the possibility of conflict in Asia, experts say – particularly “about future confrontation with the U.S.,” says Alexander Korolev, senior lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of New South Wales in Sydney.

Beijing’s view, he says, is that China and the United States “are clearly on a collision course, so we will need Russia.”

If U.S.-China relations worsen further, Beijing’s incentives to draw closer to Russia and possibly provide weapons and other military assistance – albeit as covertly as possible – will also mount. “The most likely issue which might lead to further deterioration is obviously Taiwan,” says Chen Cheng, professor of political science at the University at Albany, SUNY.

A senior Chinese official recently drew a rare direct comparison with Taiwan while underscoring how Beijing views Ukraine through the lens of regional competition with America.

“Why does the U.S. ask China not to provide weapons to Russia, while it keeps selling arms to Taiwan?” China’s new top envoy, Foreign Minister Qin Gang, said at a Beijing press conference on March 7. “Why does the U.S. talk at length about respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity on Ukraine, while disrespecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on China’s Taiwan question?”

Fast friends

A year ago, China and Russia – united by their authoritarian ideologies and desire to counterbalance the U.S.-led system of alliances – elevated their relationship with a no-limits friendship pact. In a historic joint statement in February 2022, they pledged to support each other’s “core interests,” including China’s claim to the self-governing island of Taiwan, and Russia’s interests in Ukraine and other border regions. 

Soon afterward, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, and Beijing has since refrained from condemning it, instead blaming the U.S. and NATO for the conflict.

Indeed, as Western sanctions on Russia have taken hold, experts say the Ukraine war has in some ways accelerated the linkages between the two countries – diplomatically, economically, and in their incentives to cooperate militarily. Beijing has backed Moscow in the United Nations, while disseminating Russian propaganda on the war. 

A recent Chinese peace plan for Ukraine also reiterates Russia’s assertions that the West provoked the conflict, calling for a cease-fire and end to sanctions, while presenting Beijing as a neutral mediator. China’s leader Xi Jinping reportedly will travel to Russia to meet with President Vladimir Putin next week, and afterward hold his first phone call since the war started with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Economically, cooperation between China and Russia has accelerated in the past year, as trade boomed, especially in energy and food. Russian crude oil exports to China increased 8% last year, while its annual natural gas exports are rising and are expected to grow by a quarter by 2026.

Military cooperation is also growing, as Russia and China expand joint exercises in Asia – both for training and to send a message to Washington. “They’re not preparing to fight under a joint command or anything like that, but military exercises have certain training benefits to both of their militaries, and they send a strong signal to the United States,” says Joseph Torigian, assistant professor at the School of International Service of American University in Washington. 

Western sanctions have heightened Russian dependence on China for dual-use items such as semiconductor chips, spare parts for helicopters and other equipment, and drones as well, and in the longer term, some analysts predict the war will act as a catalyst for a new and more closely integrated military relationship.

Sino-Russian interdependence

Historically, Russia has played a key role in China’s military development, providing tremendous amounts of assistance starting in the 1950s. China imported and also produced Soviet-designed weapons such as tanks, fighter jets, and missiles. Such cooperation was derailed during the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, but resumed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 – with China receiving more than $21.5 billion worth of arms from Russia between 1992 and 2005, according to the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute.

But in recent years, China’s defense modernization has improved its production capabilities and made the country less dependent on Russia, setting the stage for a partial role reversal, experts say.

“Beijing might want to provide lethal aid to Russia,” even at the price of a major punitive response from the West, says Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Russia is China’s most powerful partner on the world stage, and Beijing does not want Russia to be strategically weakened by the war.”

Moreover, he says, “the war keeps Moscow reliant on China as a lifeline and critical geopolitical partner, and it has also distracted the United States and its allies.”

Some analysts believe the Ukraine war could even spur an integration of Russian and Chinese defense programs, if lingering historic mistrust and different standards can be overcome. The two sides reportedly are already cooperating on early-warning systems for ballistic missile defense. 

“The war in Ukraine is helping to accelerate these ideas … because Russia and China will need each other more and more,” says Michael Raska, assistant professor and coordinator of the Military Transformations Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “The Russians will … increasingly rely on Chinese high-tech components for their weapons … and the Chinese would want key Russian technologies, say microchips and high-tech materials,” he says. 

Rather than make a “rash decision” to send Russia military equipment for immediate needs in Ukraine, China is more likely to expand military cooperation to meet its long-term goals in competing with the U.S., Dr. Raska adds.

“We will see this gradual augmentation, rather than massive trains of arms going from China to Russia,” he says. “Russia needs high tech, and Chinese have leverage – what can they get in return?”