NATO strikes balance between protecting Ukraine – and itself

Pentagon officials laud Ukrainian soldiers for “not asking anyone to fight for them,” as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin often points out. “All Ukraine is asking for is the means to fight – and we’re determined to provide that means.”

That equals weapons and ammunition – lots of it – and it’s no small feat to keep it coming. American military stockpiles are now “dangerously depleted,” warned a July report from the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C. 

But senior U.S. officials have answered, in effect, “We’ve got this.” These reassurances have not wavered despite lingering concerns about how, exactly, the United States and its NATO allies will balance their considerable support for Kyiv with the need to make sure they have enough arms to defend themselves if an adversary attacks. 

Still, helping Ukraine repel Russia is worth taking some risks, many military analysts say. “We’ve not been in a position where we’ve got only a few days of some critical munition left,” Pentagon comptroller Michael McCord told reporters recently. “But we are now supporting a partner who is.” 

What have the U.S. and its NATO allies already given Ukraine, anyway?

The U.S. has tapped into its existing weapons stockpiles 26 times since February, committing more than $19 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, Pentagon officials say. It’s a big jump – between 2011 and 2015, for example, the U.S. drew down stockpiles 13 times to help allies globally. This amounts to 56% of military aid to Ukraine among 40 major donor countries, according to the Kiel Institute in Germany.

This includes Javelin missiles; anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles; hundreds of Humvees and light tactical vehicles; millions of rounds of small arms ammunition; hundreds of generators, tents, and heaters; and “several thousand pieces” of cold-weather gear for the approaching winter, to name just a few key pieces of kit. 

The Pentagon has also announced that it is doubling to roughly 40 its shipments of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) to Kyiv because of their “outsize” impact on the battlefield. 

NATO allies are also opening their weapons stores to Ukraine. Slovenia pledged 40% of its tanks and Norway 45% of its howitzer long-range weapon supplies, according to Kiel Institute analysis. Russian neighbor Estonia has given the equivalent of one-third of its defense budget to Ukraine, Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur said in recent remarks at the German Marshall Fund.

Is the U.S. giving Ukraine its best stuff – and should it? 

Despite pleas from Ukraine and even some NATO allies, the U.S. has not sent fighter jets, tanks, or its Patriot air defense systems to the battlefield. 

These decisions are the result of a confluence of concerns: the risk of escalating the war with Moscow or technology falling into Russian hands, and the fact that some weapons are simply too high-tech for Ukrainian soldiers to quickly learn to operate and – equally tricky – to maintain on an unrelenting battlefield. 

Still, some NATO allies have lobbied hard for policy changes. When Germany offered to deploy Patriot missile systems along Poland’s border with Ukraine, Warsaw suggested Berlin instead deliver the systems to Kyiv. Poland made a similar suggestion earlier in the war, offering to transfer its U.S.-made fighter jets to Ukraine.

These proposals have been rejected. A single Patriot battery requires about 90 troops to operate it – troops the U.S. and Germany refuse to send to Ukraine, since should they be harmed, NATO would be forced to retaliate against Russia, catastrophically widening the war. 

There is widespread agreement that this is the right approach. At the same time, having seen the Ukrainian military in action, the U.S. has reevaluated its position to some extent, says Max Bergmann, director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.

After the first Russian invasion, which resulted in the annexing of Crimea in 2014, the U.S. remained reticent about “providing Ukraine with any sort of advanced technology, including Javelin missiles, to a military infected with Russian agents,” Mr. Bergmann says. “Now, the U.S. has opened its aperture when it comes to military technology, because Ukraine’s needs outweigh the risks of Russia getting its hands on it.”  

Will the U.S. and NATO allies have enough weapons in their stockpiles to defend themselves in the future?

The U.S. is certainly running through stockpiles of some of its weapons – an estimated one-third of its inventory of Javelin and Stinger missiles, for starters, according to a CSIS analysis. Others – guided TOW anti-tank missiles and launchers among them – remain “plentiful” alternatives. The U.S. has given more than 1.5 million 155 mm projectiles to Kyiv, “probably close to the limit” that Washington can give “without risk to its own war fighting capabilities,” the report adds.

Given battlefield demand and profit potential, defense contractors are increasing production. Lockheed Martin plans to boost output from 60 HIMARS to 96 annually, for example. These ramp-ups can take months or even years, however.

In the meantime, while officials understandably dislike dipping below designated stockpile levels, there’s always the possibility of adjusting these to “absorb a little more risk, and I think that’s something worth doing,” Mr. Bergmann says. “If a Russian tank is destroyed, that’s ultimately depleting your adversary. I think that’s something that has to be taken into account here.”