Facing Russian threat and an uncertain America, Europe rearms

Two words – stark, sober words – sum up a dramatic mood swing in Europe that could redefine, and ultimately loosen, the Continent’s decades-old alliance with the United States.

War footing.

That phrase, voiced most recently by British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in a speech last week, is especially significant because it is such a jarring departure from Europe’s long-settled economic credo.

For years, the refrain heard in European capitals has been the post-Cold War “peace dividend” – the leeway governments found they had to slash defense spending and invest more money in domestic economic and social priorities instead.

Today, Mr. Sunak is only one of a growing number of European leaders to have concluded that the days of the “peace dividend” are over, and that Europe needs to spend more – much more – on its defense.

And while they’re aware of how politically and practically daunting that goal is, they clearly feel a growing sense of urgency.

That’s because of two increasingly unsettling security concerns, one to the east, the other to the west.

The more immediate threat is Russia’s full-scale war of subjugation against Ukraine.

But there is another, longer-range worry: that, whoever wins this November’s U.S. presidential election, Europe cannot necessarily keep relying on America to be the superpower guarantor of the Continent’s security.

Both these fears have sharpened in recent weeks.

In Ukraine, Russian forces have been intensifying their attacks and begun making advances.

And in Washington, even as the Ukrainians found themselves running short of artillery shells, it took months for the Biden administration to overcome opposition from House Republicans and secure some $60 billion in desperately needed military aid for Kyiv.

European countries did try to fill the gap.

Indeed, in a letter to European Union leaders ahead of a summit six weeks ago, it was the president of the bloc’s ministerial council, Charles Michel, who first raised the call for “a paradigm shift” in Europe’s defense thinking.

“It is high time that we take radical and concrete steps,” he told them, “to be defense-ready, and put the EU’s economy on a war footing.”

The EU went on to approve more than $5 billion of additional military aid to Ukraine, and began trying to buy up all available artillery shells from other countries. But European leaders know that they simply do not have a big enough defense industry, nor large enough arms stockpiles, to come anywhere near taking over Washington’s critical role.

A more profound shift in economic priorities is clearly going to be necessary for that to become possible, especially among Europe’s main economic and military powers.

That is one reason Mr. Sunak’s comments were especially significant.

Countries on Europe’s eastern fringe, closest to Russia – such as Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states – have never needed convincing of the need to ratchet up defense investment.

Yet that message has taken considerably longer to resonate in countries further west, especially in Europe’s leading economic powerhouse, Germany, and in its main military powers, Britain and France.

Mr. Sunak, speaking in Poland with the secretary-general of the NATO alliance also in attendance, announced plans to increase Britain’s defense spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product – above the decade-old NATO target of 2%.

He urged Europe’s other NATO members to make that their new minimum, too.

Three days later, French President Emmanuel Macron also weighed in on the need for Europe to revitalize its defense industries. Emphasizing the importance of preventing Russia from prevailing in Ukraine, he said the EU should deploy its shared economic resources to ramp up arms production.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, in a social media post, responded: “France and Germany want Europe to be strong. Your speech contains good ideas on how we can achieve this.”

Still, while most European countries have begun spending more money on defense since the start of the Ukraine war, putting the Continent on a real “war footing” would be a huge and difficult undertaking.

One obvious challenge is the old economics textbook choice: guns or butter?

Europe’s economies are still stuttering from multiple jolts: the 2008 world financial crisis, the pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war. More funds for defense would inevitably mean fewer funds for already cash-strained domestic priorities.

The scale of spending needed is enormous. Most of NATO’s European members have met, or are getting close to meeting, the old 2% target. But, beyond the eastern countries nearest to Russia, very few are within reach of Mr. Sunak’s proposed higher benchmark.

His hope, Mr. Macron’s hope, and that of a growing number of other European leaders, is that voters will quickly learn the lessons of years of underinvestment in defense.

And that’s a message that would resonate with one of Mr. Sunak’s predecessors, the prime minister who first coined the idea of a “peace dividend,” along with then-U.S. President George H.W. Bush.

Speaking in 1991, shortly after losing office, Margaret Thatcher told a luncheon honoring her in Washington, “The only real peace dividend is, quite simply, peace.”

And how had her generation come to enjoy it? “Because of the investment of billions of dollars and pounds in defense.”