In shifting world, post-Soviet states look back to a constant: Russia

Winds stirred up by shifting global realities are blowing across the former Soviet region, motivating some of those independent states to recalibrate their practical relations with Russia, even if that means postponing hopes of joining the European Union.

And those winds are likely to be just a bit chillier in the wake of Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States.

Many of the factors pushing some post-Soviet states into closer ties with Russia are long-standing ones, rooted in their common heritage as part of the U.S.S.R. for several decades. But the war in Ukraine has made it much more urgent.

This comes partly from illustrating what can happen to a neighboring country that takes an overtly anti-Moscow path. But it also comes out of the creation of many profitable new business opportunities, as Russia reorients its international trade to avoid sanctions via countries that are more friendly and accessible as conduits.

The allure of the EU, which once shone brightly throughout the region, also seems to have faded amid the bloc’s many political and economic troubles, as well as its failure to help Ukraine sufficiently to stave off the Russians.

In the long tug-of-war between Russia and the West for the allegiance of post-Soviet countries, “slowly, pragmatism seems to be winning the upper hand,” says Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the Kremlin-funded Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow. “Economic interests are becoming increasingly de-ideologized, and seen more as a matter of practical necessity.

“For a long time economic self-interest was subordinated to the idea that Europe represents civilization, which must be reached by pushing away from Russia whatever the cost,” he says. “Now it’s clear that Russia is a big, strong market whose business these countries need, and it can’t be substituted by European dreams.”

Georgia in Russia’s shadow

The most obvious example of this trend is Georgia, a small nation in the South Caucasus that was the first, more than 20 years ago, to stage a “colored revolution” to overthrow a pro-Moscow leader and declare joining the West its key strategic goal.

Georgia lost a brief war with Russia in 2008, and spent several subsequent years having virtually no relations with its giant neighbor. In recent years, the ruling Georgian Dream party has moved to mend economic fences with Russia, while still insisting its long-term goal is to join the EU.

But it has also begun requiring transparency from foreign-funded civil society groups, as many countries are doing, leading the EU to suspend the country’s accession bid and cut financial aid.

The Georgian Dream party won October parliamentary elections with 54%, a result fiercely disputed by the opposition but affirmed last week by the country’s election commission. Despite ongoing protests, and criticisms of the vote from the West, the outcome seems likely to hold. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe had concerns about the elections, but noted that “voters were offered a choice between 18 candidate lists and candidates could generally campaign freely.”

“Average Georgians are more concerned with economic issues and maintaining peace than anything else – both of which rely on having better relations with Russia,” says Bryan Gigantino, a historian and lecturer at the Georgian American University in Tbilisi. He says the Georgian Dream party is not particularly “pro-Russian,” as its critics often claim, but is seeking to navigate the difficult middle ground between East and West, while maximizing benefits for Georgia.

“This line of thinking is also common among some political forces in Europe, which explains why Georgian Dream aligns so strongly with Hungary,” whose prime minister, Viktor Orbán, was the first foreign leader to visit Georgia after the election, says Mr. Gigantino.

Mr. Trump may be more understanding of this pragmatic attitude as well. Improving the very bad current relations between Washington and Tbilisi hinges on the hope that “a Trump administration would be open to a relationship that is more transactional, and less dependent on abstract and ever-changing values,” Mr. Gigantino adds.

“Geography matters”

The shifting mood is also visible in tiny Moldova. There pro-Western voters narrowly won a referendum in October on prioritizing the country’s EU membership, while pro-Western president Maia Sandu won against a candidate who espoused a Georgian-style pragmatic approach to relations with the West and Russia by a smaller margin than expected in November.

Many were shocked at the tight nature of both victories. Charges of Russian meddling, including allegations of vote-buying by a Moldovan oligarch on the lam in Russia, could have substance. Barely a year earlier polls had found almost two-thirds support for EU membership, while the referendum only passed after votes from Moldova’s diaspora in the West were counted.

Unlike Georgia, Moldova has large Russian-speaking populations, including the ethnically Turkic region of Gagauzia, which is home to about 5% of Moldovans, and the breakaway republic of Transnistria, a long strip along the Ukrainian border with another 10%. They tend to favor the direction Georgia has taken with Moscow.

“Most of the people in those Russian-speaking areas do not like the fact that Moldova joined the anti-Russian sanctions,” says Alexander Corinenco, an independent political scientist in the capital of Chișinău. “They look at Georgia and see the politics they are pursuing is more in our national interests, while they think that Moldovan leaders just want to cozy up with Europe. In Gagauzia, the local leaders congratulated Trump very publicly on his victory, because they hope it signals a change in the political direction.”

Similar trends can be seen in other post-Soviet states, such as Armenia and Kazakhstan, where post-Soviet links to the West remain strong, but the economic pull of Russia is a factor that cannot be evaded.

“Geography matters,” says Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the independent Caucasus Institute in Yerevan, Armenia. “While Georgia and Armenia aim for Europe, we know that Russia has to be taken into account.

“European values may be popular, especially among the youth, but Armenian business depends heavily on the Russian market, and cooperation is growing,” he says. “Politics is one thing, and import-export figures are quite another. For Armenia, both Russia and the West matter, and neither can be ignored.”