‘Revolution’ in Iraq? How Shiite cleric is testing a young democracy.

In the latest escalation of his self-declared “revolution” against Iraq’s political system, including a push for new elections, firebrand Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his followers Tuesday to occupy judicial offices.

They hoped to repeat their success at shutting down Iraq’s parliament, where Sadrists have camped outside for weeks to prevent the formation of a new government by political opponents. The Sadrist bloc in parliament had failed to do so itself, despite winning the largest number of seats in October 2021 elections.

But Tuesday, Sadr loyalists did not even get inside the gates of the Supreme Judicial Council building, amid a flurry of immediate negative reactions – including from top Iraqi judicial officials, Iran-backed Shiite militia leaders, and the United Nations – that warned of the further erosion of Iraqi state legitimacy.

By nightfall, Mr. Sadr’s supporters effectively had been called off, ordered by their leaders to depart judicial offices but leave their tents standing, in a show of continued “pressure.”

“What we are seeing is that the nascent democratic institutions of Iraq are being tested, in their limits and their ability to withstand these shocks,” says a political analyst and former government official in Baghdad, who asked not to be named due to the restrictions of his current job.

He says he drove by judiciary offices Tuesday night and confirmed, “the tents were there, but Sadr’s followers were not.”

Mr. Sadr “doesn’t like to play by the rules,” the analyst says.

“Our parliament doesn’t exist, because it’s being blocked by the Sadrists. Our judiciary has decided to close up shop, because of the attempt to enter by the Sadrists. And you have an interim caretaker outgoing government in the executive,” he says.

“So you’ve got the three branches of government either paralyzed or completely lacking any authority,” the analyst adds. “This is as weak as a state can get without collapsing. ... We are in uncharted territory.”

System checks seem to have worked

On the one hand, Iraq’s current political crisis reveals how vulnerable the country remains to the whims of a single, disgruntled, unelected player like Mr. Sadr. The scion of an important religious family, he commands a significant number of followers who are often likened to a cult.

Indeed, the mid-ranking Shiite cleric triggered the current stand-off himself, by abruptly ordering the 73 elected parliamentarians loyal to him – the largest single bloc – to resign en masse in June, after he failed to form a government by allying with a key Kurdish party and smaller Sunni groups.

On the other hand, institutional checks seem to have worked to a degree, preventing Mr. Sadr from completely dismantling Iraq’s nascent democracy. Despite widespread corruption, manifest imperfections, and lengthy episodes of gridlock, the system has served as political glue to Iraq’s disparate sectarian branches since American troops toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Adding to Iraq’s volatility is that Mr. Sadr, whose legions of followers spearheaded opposition to the American military occupation, and who raised the Mahdi Army militia for that purpose, is locked in an intra-Shiite political battle. On the other side is a host of rival militias and parties, many backed by Iran, that led the fight against the Islamic State beginning in 2014.

When Mr. Sadr ordered the mass resignation from parliament, his loyalists were replaced – according to a new 2021 law – by the runner-up candidates, who often were from the rival Shiite groups, called the Coordination Framework.

“They turned Iraq into a runaway train”

Abbas Kadhim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council in Washington, says a “lack of strategy” fed Mr. Sadr’s decision to withdraw his followers from parliament. Putting pressure on the judiciary as a path to new elections “is a lost battle for them,” since the judiciary can’t legally dissolve parliament, he says.

“They handed their seats to their rivals, and … wrote themselves completely out of any political participation in government,” says Dr. Kadhim. “Had they used any system of advisers, someone could have told them, ‘You are committing political suicide here,’ but nobody could step up and say this is wrong.

“And now that they are out, they want to be back,” he says. “No Iraqi political bloc can afford being out of government for three and half or four years. … They turned Iraq into a runaway train right now, with no parliament, no judiciary, and only a caretaker government whose powers are severely truncated.”

While the only remedy for Iraq’s current political dysfunction may be another election, rival Shiite parties “are using the letter of the law to the fullest extent they can to teach their opponents a lesson: ‘You made a mistake, and that is not without a price,’” says Dr. Kadhim. “It’s not a bad thing,” he adds, “otherwise, any person with 2,000 or 3,000 people can go and occupy the parliament and put Iraq into a crisis again.”

Mr. Sadr’s demand for new elections, meanwhile, is raising questions among Iraqis about why another vote is necessary after the October 2021 round in which Mr. Sadr’s supporters performed so well. Reflecting Iraqis’ growing disenchantment with their political system, that round saw the lowest turnout in the post-Saddam era, at just 43%, compared with some 70% in the legislative election of 2005.

Last October’s election was itself conducted early – and largely freely and fairly, according to U.N. and other observers – thanks to massive 2019-2021 civil society protests against corruption, lack of job prospects, and electricity shortages, as well as the outsized influence of Iran-backed Shiite militias on politics. 

What will satisfy the Sadrists?

Unlike those protests, which had the backing of a broad swath of angry Iraqis, the current power play on the street is being carried out exclusively by followers of Mr. Sadr. It’s not clear if a fresh election – which in any event would take at least a year to organize, and require new funding – would be enough to satisfy the expectations Mr. Sadr has raised among his followers of a “revolution.”

“He’s made such a show, going into the Green Zone and occupying parliament,” says Hamzeh Hadad, a Baghdad-based fellow of the European Council on Foreign Relations.

He notes that when Mr. Sadr first played that card in 2016, his followers stormed parliament and achieved a broad cabinet reshuffle that brought in a number of technocrat ministers. “He was able to say, ‘Look, I took you into parliament, this is the result we achieved, this is what we wanted,’” says Mr. Hadad.

The bar is much higher now, he says, because Sadrists had so many seats to start with; because of the unprecedented length of time they have blocked parliament; and because Mr. Sadr has shifted from his usual nationalistic rhetoric to invoke a Shiite religious framework.

“You can’t talk about revolution in those terms, and not have something to give,” says Mr. Hadad. “Yes, he has a very cult-like following, but they, too, want results.”

Mr. Sadr is banking that a new election will be enough to qualify as a “revolution,” while also being acceptable to his Kurdish and Sunni allies, says Mr. Hadad.

Yet the demand for a new election, even if it becomes feasible, is prompting concerns for Iraqi democracy.

“It’s one of the flaws in the system,” says the Baghdad analyst who asked not to be named. “Yes, we do hold elections, and we do have people represent us in parliament. But what good is that if they take their orders from their political party leaders?”

“This is the biggest thing that is going to hurt Iraq in the long run,” says Mr. Hadad. “Many think, day-to-day short-term, ‘We please everyone, we hold them together, we hold new elections, everyone is happy,’” he says.

“The issue is going to be Iraq’s democratization, which has been progressing over the long term,” he adds. “[Early elections] could be a big hindrance. ... In the public eye, it is decreasing its legitimacy.”