Why a US-Israel divide is widening over the war, and Gaza’s future

As the war in Gaza enters its third month, the Biden administration is toughening its demands on Israel regarding the conduct of the war – an acknowledgment at least in part of shifting U.S. public opinion and of increasingly agitated Arab allies.

In response, Israel is pledging to carry out its campaign in the southern Gaza Strip with greater precision and care for limiting civilian casualties than it did in the north. The war there in recent weeks has caused widespread devastation and inflicted a high civilian toll among Palestinians.

But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces internal pressures of his own. They come from an Israeli public, hardened by the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, that will accept nothing less than the promised “destruction” of Hamas. And they come from the extremists in Mr. Netanyahu’s government, who are determined to use the war to pursue their vision for handling the broader Palestinian conflict.

These countervailing pressures are setting the stage for looming clashes that will test what to now has been Washington’s “ironclad” support for Israel in its war on Hamas.

“Absolutely a number of conflicts are brewing” over both the war and its aftermath, says Doron Ben-Atar, a historian of Middle East conflicts at Fordham University in New York.

“Washington’s timer for the military operation is ticking faster than Israel’s,” he says, while “the two visions for what comes after the war are very different. The U.S. and the rest of the world ultimately want a Palestinian state to come out of this,” he adds, “while Netanyahu and his right-wing government are opposed, to say the least.”

The clashes over postwar visions are almost certain to surface much sooner than any negotiations on an independent Palestine, which are far off at best.

U.S. “principles” over Gaza

On a hastily organized trip to Dubai over the weekend, Vice President Kamala Harris laid out a list of “principles” that the United States says should guide the future of a postwar Gaza.

In a statement summarizing Ms. Harris’ conversation Saturday with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, her office said, “Under no circumstances will the United States permit the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank, the besiegement of Gaza, or the redrawing of the borders of Gaza.”

But on almost every count, the Israeli government is staunchly opposed to, and is floating proposals that fly in the face of, the U.S. demands.

For now, however, Israeli political and military officials acknowledge that their offensive into south Gaza, which has reached the Hamas stronghold of Khan Yunis, Gaza’s second-largest city, will have to be conducted more carefully.

The southern offensive “will be different than what happened [over] several weeks ... in the north,” one senior Israeli official acknowledged late last week. “We see eye to eye with the American administration” on the goals of the war, he added. “The focus is on eliminating this terror group ... and to make sure civilians are out of harm’s way.”

The Israeli government and military have received the Biden administration’s message loud and clear.

Speaking on the condition of anonymity, one person familiar with U.S.-Israel discussions says the southern offensive “has to be done with a smaller military footprint. You can’t have the same number of civilian casualties in the south than in the north, you need a clear humanitarian plan, and you need to have places where civilians can go.”

Mr. Netanyahu has acknowledged the need to acquiesce to Washington’s demands to some extent, saying Saturday, “If you don’t have the international space, you won’t have the military space.”

Still, it remains unclear to what extent Israel really is heeding the pressures from the U.S. and international voices, including the United Nations, to head off a humanitarian catastrophe. Wednesday night the Israeli security cabinet finally approved a small increase in humanitarian aid into Gaza – despite opposition to the measure from hard-liners in the Netanyahu coalition.

What’s different this time

The shifts from what initially was unbridled U.S. support, and Israel’s efforts to appear responsive to its most critical ally’s demands, fit a pattern of past Israel-Hamas conflicts, some longtime experts in U.S.-Israel relations say.

Except that this time, they add, things are different.

“One difference is that Israel was allowed a longer leash because of the terrible brutality of Oct. 7,” says Fordham’s Dr. Ben-Atar. “But what is radically different,” he adds, “is that the U.S. can’t actually push Israel to stop fighting, because this time it’s the Israeli people who are demanding that the war not stop as long as Hamas is in control of Gaza.”

Indeed, the view of an overwhelming majority of Israelis, according to opinion polls, is clear. They believe the war must not end until Israel’s objectives are met: destroying Hamas as a military and governing force in the Gaza Strip, and retrieving all of the estimated 140 remaining hostages.

That view was on display at a highway junction not far from the Gaza frontier in south Israel Wednesday, as one older Israeli man said while handing out sandwiches and drinks to uniformed and armed soldiers. “This is the most just war that’s ever been,” said the man, who identified himself only as Yair. “And if the government doesn’t go all the way and finish the job, then we will.”

Young Democrats shifting

In the U.S., the political calculations are very different, however, with President Joe Biden facing mounting pressure from key Democratic constituencies to rein in Israel and stop the war.

“We’re seeing a real shift in American opinion, but most significantly among the president’s key constituencies, from an initial spike in support for Israel after the Hamas attacks to greater concern about high civilian casualties and support for a cease-fire,” says Shibley Telhami, a professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland and director of the university’s Critical Issues Poll.

“Among young Democrats in particular,” he adds, “we’re seeing a clear shift to the Palestinians – even less willingness to vote for Biden again over his strong pro-Israel stance.”

White House officials insist Mr. Biden has been increasingly forceful in his private conversations with Mr. Netanyahu. Yet “the time is coming,” Dr. Telhami says, “especially as we enter an election year, when the president is going to have to take account of the [public opinion] warnings and speak out on this himself.”

Another clash is brewing over who should govern a post-Hamas Gaza.

In public remarks over the weekend, Vice President Harris said the Palestinian Authority, which has partial control of the Israeli-occupied West Bank, should eventually govern Gaza – espousing a solution sketched earlier to some degree by Mr. Biden.

“The Palestinian Authority must be revitalized, driven by the will of the Palestinian people,” she said. In addition, PA security forces “must be strengthened to eventually assume security responsibilities in Gaza.”

But there is little doubt over Mr. Netanyahu’s total rejection of this position.

“We would be putting the same element – utterly unreformed, utterly unchanged – into Gaza, and that’s ... what even the best of our friends suggest,” the prime minister said Saturday. “I think differently,” he added. “I think we need to build something else.”

What that “something else” might be remains unclear, although many Israeli analysts say the day is fast approaching when the government is going to spell out its postwar plans for Gaza.

Governments’ durability

Yet even as the Israeli government and the Biden administration attempt in coming weeks to meld their visions for the future, they will face daunting stumbling blocks, some experts say.

Mr. Biden faces a reelection bid next year that a number of recent polls suggest “he could very well lose over this,” Dr. Telhami says.

Moreover, many political experts in both Israel and the U.S. have strong doubts that Mr. Netanyahu, whose support in polls is at low ebb, can survive politically after the war.

But perhaps the biggest obstacle to any lasting peaceful resolution of the war will come from the Israeli and Palestinian publics themselves.

“In my mind, I can draw the borders of a Palestinian state that includes Gaza. I can picture how that state could be secured in a way that allows Israel to live in security,” Dr. Ben-Atar says.

“But for any of that to have a chance to work, the people have to trust each other, and I can tell you there is zero trust,” he says. “Right now there is a complete breakdown of trust between the two sides, and that’s not going to be fixed soon.”