After year of war in Gaza, Hamas is mostly unseen. But it’s surviving.

Degraded but not defeated, underground but enduring, Hamas’ low-profile survival in Gaza is challenging both the organization’s and Israel’s narratives of “victory” one year into a devastating war triggered by its deadly attack a year ago.

As Israel ramps up its war with Hamas ally Hezbollah in Lebanon – deepening its ground offensive into southern Lebanon and striking Beirut over the weekend – Yahya Sinwar, mastermind of the Oct. 7 attack, still appears to be operating a potent, if battered, militant movement.

Largely unseen by the population of Gaza above ground, Hamas has lost its security grip over much of the strip but still retains fighters and popularity one year on – though recent polls suggest it is vastly more popular in the West Bank than in Gaza.

Amid a steep cost in civilian lives in Gaza, neither the Israeli military’s ability to dislodge Hamas nor the movement’s postwar future is certain.

Hamas’ attack in Israel last year killed 1,200 people, seized 250 hostages, and triggered a ruthless Israeli military offensive that has pulverized the strip. As of this week it has killed 41,000 people, the majority civilians, including 17,000 children.

Hamas’ attack also prompted Hezbollah to fire a barrage of rockets into Israel one day later, an assault it has kept up since and that the Lebanese militant movement said would end only with a cease-fire in Gaza.

These Hezbollah rockets drove over 60,000 Israelis from their homes in northern towns and villages and sowed the seeds for the current conflict in Lebanon and attacks between Israel and Hezbollah patron Iran, which threaten to overshadow the Israel-Hamas war itself.

Military losses

Internally, Hamas is reorganizing after the loss of several of its leaders.

The most high-profile are political leader and lead negotiator Ismail Haniyeh, whom Israel assassinated in Tehran, Iran, in July, and Mohammed Deif, Hamas’ top military commander, whom Israel claims to have killed in a July airstrike, though Hamas disputes that.

Mr. Haniyeh’s death led to Mr. Sinwar’s quick succession as head of the movement’s political arm, further consolidating the hard-liner’s power, though rumors about his condition have proliferated in recent weeks as his hand-delivered messages to other Hamas leaders have lessened. Some say he has not been heard from in weeks.

Israel also claims to have killed Rawhi Mushtaha, the de facto Hamas prime minister and Mr. Sinwar’s right-hand man.

“No one can deny that we have paid a very high price when it comes to the movement in general and the political leadership in particular,” says Basem Naim, a member of the Hamas politburo in Qatar and former Gaza minister of health.

Yet he and other Hamas sources describe the leadership losses as only temporary setbacks.

“Since the foundation of the movement in 1987, we are used every now and then to lose our leadership, from Sheikh [Ahmed] Yassin onwards,” Mr. Naim says, referring to Hamas’ founder and spiritual leader, who was killed by Israel in 2004. “On each of these occasions, the movement became stronger. Compare Hamas in 1987 to Hamas 2023-24, and you will see a clear rising curve at the political, popular, and military levels.”

Israel says it has killed more than 17,000 of Hamas’ estimated 25,000 to 35,000 fighters. Hamas officials dispute these numbers but acknowledge that “thousands” of fighters have been killed.

Independent verification of Hamas’ capabilities is currently not possible. Israel prevents international journalists from entering Gaza, and Palestinian journalists face extreme dangers, with more than 130 killed by the Israeli military since the start of the war.

But international analysts tracking Hamas’ military engagements and frequency of attacks say they believe up to 20 of Hamas’ 24 battalions have been defeated or severely degraded. Companies and brigades cut off by Israeli-controlled land corridors are unable to communicate with one another.

Two to four functioning battalions remain in central Gaza, which has not witnessed the same intense Israeli ground operations as have the north and south, according to the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute.

“Looking at Hamas’ military capabilities, the constraints [it is] operating under will make it hard to rebuild itself into the same organization it was on Oct. 7,” says Brian Carter, an American Enterprise Institute researcher.

But without alternative leadership in Gaza, he says, Israel, which will be hard-pressed to maintain its presence, faces a “risk that Hamas can reconstitute itself” in the long term.

Sources close to Hamas say it may be preserving a small number of select battalions, keeping them from engaging in combat, to exert postwar influence over the Gaza Strip and position itself as a kingmaker in Palestinian politics.

“Hamas is looking to the day after the end of the war. It knows that by surviving and keeping some armed forces it can project victory,” says a Palestinian source, who declined to be named for fear of retribution by Israel, “and dominate both Gaza and Palestinian politics.”

Absent above ground

On the surface in Gaza, however, Hamas is practically nowhere to be found.

Residents report a civil police force and security services that rarely show up when they are needed.

That has led many Gazans to conclude that Hamas has been all but ousted from much of Gaza, creating a vacuum filled by gangs and clans.

The Gaza government, a mix of Hamas die-hards, independents, and civil servants appointed both by Hamas and by the Palestinian Authority before Hamas’ 2007 takeover of Gaza, has been decimated by Israeli missile strikes and assassinations hitting everyone from high-ranking Hamas officials to non-Hamas police cadets and nurses.

“Before the war, the Gaza government and Hamas had significant security influence across all areas. However, during the war, this influence has diminished across the board,” says a Gaza engineer who did not wish to be named.

He and other residents say that while Hamas’ security apparatus exerts influence in northern Gaza and the ruins of Gaza City, its control is “partial or nonexistent” in central and southern Gaza.

Only when there is an ease in Israeli airstrikes do Hamas security services reemerge in brief instances in limited areas. Gaza police are only willing to risk their lives to appear in cases of murder, residents say.

None of the dozens of Gaza residents interviewed say they have seen Hamas battalions or fighters since the start of the war.

Nisreen Alkhatib, a translator and journalist, says her brother-in-law, not a member of Hamas but someone she describes as a “dedicated policeman” who worked to secure aid trucks entering Gaza, was killed in an Israeli strike this summer.

Due to a high death rate, few recruits have been willing to sign up for the police or security services, sources say.

Chaos and crime

Testing Hamas’ limited capabilities is the reemergence of armed gangs and clans, who held sway in Gaza before 2007. Soaring theft and violent competition for scarce food and resources amid the Israeli blockade have overwhelmed the few police officers who try to do something about it.

An aid worker based in Deir al-Balah says the “war has created an environment ripe for chaos, crime, and instability,” which a largely underground Hamas is unable to contain.

When Ashraf Abu Hussein discovered his home in Deir al-Balah had been ransacked by looters during his family’s displacement by Israeli forces, the father of five went to a police station and was surprised to find it open.

He was asked by officers to list the stolen items – a fuel cylinder, shoes, kitchenware, TV, fan, clothes, chairs – but there was no follow-up.

“I doubt the thieves will ever be caught. There are organized gangs moving through houses and stealing everything,” Mr. Abu Hussein says. “Every day, we witness numerous disputes and quarrels between families and neighbors. Yet the police are rarely seen.”

But Gaza residents agree that no matter the battlefield losses, Hamas as a political movement will endure long after the war.

“Since [the Hamas government] is part of the people and the people are part of it, it won’t die,” says Ms. Alkhatib, the translator.

“Hamas is not only in Gaza. Hamas is in the West Bank, in Jerusalem, and in the diaspora. It is not only a military group,” says Mr. Naim, the Hamas politburo member, highlighting its ongoing “social, academic, political, and religious” activities.

Multiple Arab diplomatic sources say that should the war end today, Hamas retains sufficient military power to mount an insurgency or undermine any new governing entity in Gaza.

Hamas officials cast its survival as victory.

“We don’t see Hamas as defeated in this round of the conflict,” says Mr. Naim.

“Israel declared three goals: to crush Hamas, to push Palestinians into Egypt, and retrieve the Israeli hostages. To us, it has failed to achieve any of its goals.”